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It is generally accepted that public provision of unemployment insurance
(UI) is socially desirable in a world with risk averse individuals. However,
it is also well established that the provision of UI does not come without
adverse incentive eﬀects. For example, more generous UI beneﬁts is likely
to reduce search eﬀort and raise wage pressure, thus causing some increase
in unemployment. The problem facing policy makers is thus to strike an
optimal balance between the insurance beneﬁts on the one hand, and the
adverse incentive eﬀects on the other hand. This problem has been the
subject of several recent papers. Our paper contributes to this literature
by recognizing that the government may condition beneﬁtp a y m e n t so n
(imperfectly) observed search eﬀort. This leads us to an analysis of optimal
UI design in a search equilibrium framework where the government has
several policy instruments at its disposal, including the beneﬁt level, the
rate at which search eﬀort is monitored, and the magnitude of the sanction
in case search eﬀort is regarded as insuﬃcient. We ﬁnd that a system
with monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement relative
to other alternatives for reasonable estimates of the monitoring costs.
Our results on the desirability of monitoring can be contrasted with a
well-known result that dates back to Becker’s (1968) celebrated paper on
optimal crime deterrence. In Becker’s analysis (as in ours), monitoring is
costly because resources have to be spent on detecting crime (violations of
search requirements). Punishment, in the form of a ﬁne (sanction), goes
without cost since it involves a transfer of money from one individual to
others. To deter crime the expected ﬁne, i.e., the probability of being
caught times the ﬁne, should be big enough. By raising the ﬁne, monitor-
ing costs can be reduced without aﬀecting incentives for crime. However,
Becker’s analysis presupposes risk neutral agents. When agents are risk
averse and there are errors in the monitoring technology, Becker’s result
need not hold. If the monitoring technology is plagued by Type II errors,
some complying individuals are sanctioned and these individuals will be
subjected to substantial welfare losses when ﬁnes are high.1
1This squares with the conclusion in Polinsky and Shavell (1979). They conclude
that risk aversion weakens the case for the Beckerian policy prescription. Furthermore,
they note that the possibility of making Type II errors reinforces this conclusion. See
Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for recent surveys of the economic
theory of law enforcement.
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quencing of beneﬁt payments over the spell of unemployment. The key
result was that the beneﬁt level should decline monotonically over the
unemployment spell, because such a proﬁle involves stronger incentives to
search. Recently a number of papers have extended the analysis of Shavell
and Weiss. One strand of the literature adds additional policy instruments;
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) is a case in point. Another strand of the
literature (e.g. Cahuc and Lehmann, 2000, and Fredriksson and Holmlund,
2001) takes account of ﬁrm behavior and allows for endogenous wage de-
termination. Endogenous wages is potentially important since a declining
beneﬁtp r o ﬁle can raise wage pressure. Wage pressure may rise because
it is the value of unemployment upon unemployment entry that enters
the worker’s outside option. The analysis in Fredriksson and Holmlund
(2001), however, suggests that there is still a case for having a declining
proﬁle of beneﬁtp a y m e n t s .
The contributions reviewed above, and most of the other literature
on optimal UI, do not consider that the government can make the re-
ceipt of beneﬁts dependent on the unemployed worker’s search eﬀort. As
documented by Grubb (2001), existing UI systems condition beneﬁtp a y -
ments on performance criteria such as “availability for work” and “active
job search”. These criteria are enforced by some degree of monitoring of
the beneﬁt claimants. The requirements for job search show substantial
variations across countries.
Failure to meet search requirements may result in a beneﬁts a n c t i o n ,
i.e., a temporary or permanent cut in beneﬁts. A typical duration of
sanctions for a ﬁrst refusal of a suitable job oﬀer is two to three months.
Observed sanction rates — the total number of sanctions over a year relative
to the stock of beneﬁciaries — also vary substantially across countries. For
example, sanctions due to insuﬃcient search hovered around 30 percent
in the United States in the late 1990s, whereas other countries (Germany,
Denmark, Norway) appear to have undertaken no sanctions related to
search inactivity; see Grubb (2001) for further details.
Recent empirical work has shed light on the eﬀects of changes in search
requirements and monitoring of job search. The arguably most convincing
evidence is based on randomized experiments undertaken in the United
States. The “treatments” in these experiments involved the number of
employer contacts, the required documentation and the frequency of veri-
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more demanding search requirements tend to reduce the length of bene-
ﬁt claims. Recent non-experimental evidence from the Netherlands and
Switzwerland also suggest that the imposition of sanctions substantially
raises the transition rate to employment (Abbring et al., 1997; van den
Berg et al., 1998; Lalive et al., 2002). Our reading of the bulk of the
evidence is that more intensive monitoring and more stringent search re-
quirements do matter for search activity and transitions out of unemploy-
ment.3
The literature on monitoring and sanctions in the context of UI is very
small. The study most closely related to what we do in the present paper
is Boone and van Ours (2000). The model is a version of the Pissarides
(1990) search and matching model and has similarities with the model in
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001). A key feature of the model is that the
unemployed and insured worker can aﬀect the probability of continued UI
receipt by the choice of search eﬀort; the higher the search eﬀort, the lower
the risk of being exposed to a beneﬁts a n c t i o n .
The analysis of monitoring and sanctions is clearly related to the analy-
sis of the optimal sequencing of UI beneﬁts. Indeed, one can think of the
declining proﬁle of beneﬁt payments as an indirect “sanction” on deﬁ-
cient job search. The deﬁning characteristic of a monitoring and sanction
system, however, is that the risk of being sanctioned depends directly on
search activity. This feature can have substantial implications for policy
prescriptions. Let us illustrate this point by considering a world with risk
aversion and a ﬁn i t ea r r i v a lr a t eo fj o bo ﬀers. In this situation, a system
with a time limit on UI beneﬁt receipt can never have “Beckerian proper-
ties”. The reason is that some workers will be penalized as time passes.
However, a Becker-type solution is a distinct possibility when the risk of
being penalized depends directly on search. If the monitoring technology
is perfect, the government can implement the optimal search intensity by
threatening to impose the maximal sanction.4
2See OECD (2001), Johnson and Klepinger (1994), Benus et al. (1997) and Black et
al. (1999).
3There is at least one study, van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2001), that fails to
conﬁrm that more intensive monitoring aﬀects transitions out of unemployment. The
authors conjecture that the result may reﬂe c tt h a tm o r es t r i n g e n tm o n i t o r i n go ff o r m a l
search induces a substitution away from informal search channels.
4This a viable strategy with risk aversion since there will be no sanctions in equilib-
rium when the monitoring technology is perfect.
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(2000) and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) by oﬀering a normative
analysis of a beneﬁt system with costly monitoring and sanctions. The
basic model features two beneﬁt levels which can be thought of as unem-
ployment insurance (UI) and unemployment assistance (UA), respectively.
Workers who receive UI are monitored at a certain rate and, with some
probability, exposed to a beneﬁt sanction. The probability of being sanc-
tioned depends on the worker’s search eﬀort and the precision at which
search eﬀort can be observed by the UI provider. Sanctioned workers re-
ceive UA, they are not monitored, and they need to become reemployed
before they are entitled to UI. We are concerned with the characteristics
of the optimal beneﬁt system when there are four available policy instru-
ments: the level of beneﬁts in UI and UA (the diﬀerence between the two
representing the sanction), the rate at which the unemployed worker en-
titled to UI is monitored, and the precision of the monitoring technology
that determines how the agent’s search eﬀort aﬀect the probability of a
sanction.
The next section of the paper presents the basic model. Section 3
derives some analytical results concerning the properties of the optimal
beneﬁt system. In section 4, we turn to a numerical analysis of the optimal
beneﬁt system. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 The labor market
We consider an economy with a ﬁxed labor force, which is normalized
to unity. Workers are either employed or unemployed and have inﬁnite
horizons. Time is continuous. An employed worker is separated from his
j o ba ta ne x o g e n o u sP o i s s o nr a t eφ. Upon entering unemployment, the
worker is immediately eligible for UI beneﬁts.
Recipients of UI beneﬁts are monitored with respect to their search
behavior. If they fail to meet certain search requirements, they are exposed
t oab e n e ﬁt withdrawal (a sanction). We assume that the sanction lasts for
the remainder of the unemployment spell. At every instant, there are thus
two groups of unemployed workers: eligible workers who receive beneﬁts
and sanctioned workers who have been exposed to a beneﬁt withdrawal.
Let αj, j = e,s denote the exit rate from unemployment to employ-
6 IFAU — Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctionsment for an eligible and a sanctioned worker, respectively. The exit rates
diﬀer between the two groups to the extent that their search eﬀort diﬀer.
Let sj, j = e,s,d e n o t es e a r c he ﬀort. The eﬀective number of searchers in
the economy is then given as S = seue + ssus,w h e r euj is the number of
unemployed in category j.
The matching function is of the usual constant returns to scale variety:
H = H(S,v),w h e r ev is the number of vacancies. Let θ ≡ v/S denote
labor market tightness. The probability per unit time that individual i







iα(θ).A l s o , α(θ)=H(S,v)/S = H(1,θ) and hence α0(θ) > 0;t h e
tighter the labor market, the easier to ﬁnd a job. Firms ﬁll vacancies at
the rate q(θ)=H(S,v)/v = H(1/θ,1), and thus q0(θ) < 0; the tighter the
labor market, the more diﬃcult to ﬁll a vacancy. By constant returns to
scale, we also have α(θ)=θq(θ).
While unemployed and receiving UI beneﬁts, an unemployed agent is
monitored at rate µ. We think of monitoring as random inspections of the
worker’s search activity. Given monitoring, there is some probability that
the observed search eﬀort does not meet the search requirement, in which
case the worker is sanctioned. Let π(se) denote the probability of being
sanctioned upon inspection of search eﬀort, implying that UI recipients
loose entitlement at the rate µπ(se).
Having deﬁned the relevant transition rates, we can state the aggregate
ﬂow equilibrium relationships of the labor market:
φn = αeue + αsus (1)
αsus = µπue (2)
where n =1−ue−us denotes total employment in the economy. The ﬁrst
equation pertains to employment whereas the second equation pertains to
the state of unemployment with a sanction. Now we can use (1) and (2)
to solve for employment:
n =
λ(αe + µπ)
φ + λ(αe + µπ)
(3)
where λ ≡ ue/(ue +us)=αs/(αs +µπ)) is the ratio of eligible unemploy-
ment to total unemployment.
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Let us make the monitoring and sanctions technology explicit. We choose
a reduced form speciﬁcation which allows us to have as special cases indef-
inite payments of UI beneﬁts (µ =0 ), ﬁnite duration of UI beneﬁt receipt
(µ>0 and π(se
i)=1 ), and a monitoring and sanctions technology. In
particular, we assume that the probability of being sanctioned upon in-
spection depends linearly on search: π(se
i)=1−σse
i.P r o p o s i t i o n2b e l o w
gives conditions under which σ>0 is optimal. Further, we require that
π (se
i) ≥ 0 for all se
i ∈ [0,1], which, in turn, implies that σ ∈ [0,1].
The parameter σ measures to which extent the sanction probability
depends on an agent’s own search eﬀort. One way to interpret σ is that
it indexes the precision of the inspection technology. For instance, σ =
0 corresponds to the situation where it is determined by lottery if the
agent has searched to rule or not; therefore, everyone who is monitored
is sanctioned irrespective of search intensity. Alternatively, σ =0can be
seen as a UI system with a time limit, as in Fredriksson and Holmlund
(2001). If, on the other hand, σ is strictly positive the agent’s search
eﬀort matters for the sanction probability. The higher is σ, the higher the
precision with which an agent’s search eﬀort is observed and rewarded.5
Whereas σ =0gives little direct incentive to search, it is an inexpensive
system to operate. This is due to the fact that there are no inspections of
agents’ search eﬀort. On the other hand, σ>0 gives a direct incentive to
search but also implies that more monitoring oﬃcials are needed in order
to inspect agents’ search intensities. So the monitoring cost per monitored
agent is increasing in σ.
More precisely, we assume that the cost of running the monitoring and
sanctioning system, C,i sg i v e nb y :
C = c(σ)µuew (4)
The costs of running the UI-system are increasing in the number of
monitored individuals (µue) .T h er a t eo fi n c r e a s ei sd e t e r m i n e db yc(σ) ≥
0. This cost depends on the precision of the inspection technology with
c0(σ) ≥ 0 and c(0) = 0. We think of the inspection of search as a labor
5From a more general point of view, it is possible to derive this technology from “ﬁrst
principles” with the aid of a few assumptions. We present this derivation in Appendix
A.
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the aggregate wage w.
2.3 Worker behavior
The employed worker’s (indirect) instantaneous utility is determined by
his wage, w. The unemployed worker receives unemployment beneﬁts, B,
as long as he is eligible. When sanctioned, he receives Z.W e s h o w i n
proposition 1 below that B>Z . We assume that workers do not have
access to a capital market, so consumption equals income at each instant.
We take the utility functions to be strictly concave in income and
leisure. The unemployed worker’s instantaneous utility is decreasing in
search eﬀort, since search reduces time available for leisure. The utility
function for the eligible unemployed worker is υ(B,se
i) and for the sanc-
tioned worker it is υ(Z,ss
i). The employed worker’s utility is given by
υ(wi,h),w h e r eh denotes hours of work; we take h as exogenously ﬁxed.
Let r denote the subjective rate of time preference and let Uj and E be
the expected present values of being unemployed, j = e,s, and employed,
respectively. The value functions can then be written as:
rUe






i ) − µπ(se
i)(Ue
i − Us)} (5)
rUs







rEi = υ(wi,h) − φ(Ei − Ue) (7)
The unemployed worker chooses search eﬀort to maximize rU
j
i .T h e
ﬁrst-order conditions are given by:
υs(B,se)+α(θ)(E − Ue) − µπs (se)(Ue − Us)=0 (8)
υs(Z,ss)+α(θ)(E − Us)=0 (9)
where partial derivatives with respect to search eﬀort are indicated by
subscript s. In these expressions we have imposed symmetry, i.e., we have
made use of the fact that workers are identical and choose the same search
eﬀort. The ﬁrst-order conditions convey the usual message:6 at the opti-
mum, the marginal cost of search should equal the marginal beneﬁts. The
6The second-order conditions for a maximum are fulﬁl l e db yt h ec o n c a v i t yo fυ(·)
and the linearity of π.
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The marginal beneﬁt involves the gain in utility associated with a transi-
tion to employment, i.e., α(θ)(E − Uj), j = e,s. For the eligible worker,
there is an additional beneﬁt of more intensive search, as revealed by the
third term on the right-hand side of (8). More intensive search reduces the
probability of being sanctioned, thus prolonging the expected duration of
beneﬁt payments. This does not imply, however, that eligible workers nec-
essarily search harder than sanctioned workers. The eﬀect pulling in the
opposite direction is B>Z : sanctioned workers gain more from ﬁnding
a job than eligible workers since E − Us >E− Ue holds in equilibrium.
Which eﬀect dominates depends on the parameters of the UI system.
We assume that the instantaneous utility functions take the form:
υ(m,l)=l nm + Γ(l),m = {w,B,Z},l= {1 − ¯ h,1 − se,1 − ss}
where m denotes (real) income, which depends on the worker’s labor mar-
ket position. The employed worker receives a wage w; the eligible unem-
ployed worker receives unemployment insurance, B; and an unemployed
worker who has been exposed to a sanction receives unemployment assis-
tance, Z.F u r t h e r m o r e ,Γ(l) represents the value of leisure with Γ0(l) > 0
and Γ00(l) < 0.
2.4 Firms and wage bargaining
Assume that government expenditure on beneﬁts and monitoring is ﬁ-
nanced by a proportional payroll tax paid by ﬁrms. Labor productivity is
constant and denoted y. The cost of holding a vacancy is ky,w i t hk>0.
Let V denote the present value of a vacant job and J t h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo f
an occupied job. The value functions are of the usual form:
rV = −ky + q(θ)(J − V ) (10)
rJ = y − w(1 + t) − φ(J − V ) (11)
where t is the proportional payroll tax rate. With free entry of new va-
cancies, V =0 , we obtain the wage cost as proportional to the marginal
product of labor, i.e.,
w(1 + t)=[ 1− (r + φ)k/q(θ)]y (12)
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d(θ)y, we refer to wc = d(θ)y as the zero proﬁt condition, with d0(θ) < 0.




β [J(wi) − V ]
1−β ,β ∈ (0,1)









where V =0and symmetry have been imposed. The Nash bargain implies
a wage-setting relationship, i.e., a relationship between bargained wages
and labor market tightness. We assume that the government ﬁxes the
replacement rates in this economy. Hence Z = zw and B = bw where
z and b are policy parameters. The replacement rates are deﬁned with
respect to the economy-wide average wage which the individual employee
perceives to be independent of his wage demands; therefore ∂Ue/∂w =0 .
Finally, the relative size of the beneﬁt sanction is denoted by p,i . e . p
satisﬁes z =( 1− p)b.
2.5 Equilibrium
Our assumptions imply that the model has a convenient recursive struc-
ture; the model in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) has a similar struc-
ture. The zero-proﬁt condition and the wage-setting relationship deter-
mine θ and wc.T os e et h i s ,n o t et h a tw i t hf r e ee n t r yo fv a c a n c i e sw eh a v e
J = ky/q(θ) and wc = d(θ)y, which implies that the right-hand side of
(13) is increasing in θ but independent of sj. Moreover, the left-hand side
of (13) is a function of θ but independent of w given our chosen utility
function and the fact that income during unemployment is proportional
to the aggregate wage. It can also be shown that E − Ue is independent
of sj, an envelope property implied by optimal search behavior. With θ
determined, we get sj from (8) and (9), since the diﬀerences in present
values are independent of w.W i t hθ and sj determined, we obtain uj and
n from (1)-(3).
Notice that θ, wc, sj, uj and n are independent of the tax rate, t.T h e
latter can be determined residually from the government’s budget restric-
tion, noting that the government uses the wage tax to ﬁnance beneﬁts and
monitoring costs:
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With the tax rate determined, the worker’s take-home wage is obtained
from w = wc/(1 + t).
3 Optimal unemployment insurance
The optimal unemployment insurance system involves four instruments:
b, p, µ,a n dσ. We use a utilitarian welfare function, i.e., welfare (W) is de-
ﬁned as: W = uerUe+usrUs+n(rE+rJ)+vrV where V =0by the free
entry condition. We ignore discounting; hence it is valid to compare alter-
native steady states without considering the adjustment process. With no
discounting, the welfare objective simpliﬁes to an employment-weighted
average of instantaneous utilities, i.e.
W = nυ(w,h)+ueυ(B,se)+usυ(Z,ss) (15)
The optimal policy maximizes (15) subject to the market equilibrium
conditions, sj = sj(b,p,µ,σ) and θ = θ(b,p,µ,σ), as well as the balanced
budget constraint, t = t(b,p,µ,σ).L e tρ = {b,p,µ,σ} denote the vector
of policy parameters. Hence the vector of ﬁrst-order conditions is given
by (dW/dρ)=0 .
Before proceeding to the numerical results it is useful to state two
analytical results. First of all, the key result in Fredriksson and Holmlund
(2001) applies directly. The following proposition reiterates proposition 2
in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001)
Proposition 1 The optimal policy involves p>0, provided that an inte-
rior solution to dW/db =0exists.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose b>0 and consider the
trial solution p =0 . At p =0 , the ﬁrst-order condition for σ has a solution
at σ =0because c0 (σ) ≥ 0. Moreover, the condition for µ is irrelevant. So,
let us ﬁx µ at some arbitrary, but interior, value: µ0 ∈ (0,∞). The uniform
beneﬁts t r u c t u r e( p =0 ) cannot be optimal if (dW/dp) > 0 at p =0 . Some












12 IFAU — Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctionswhere ∂W/∂ss > 0 denotes the partial derivative of welfare with respect
to ss holding θ constant, and ∂ss/∂p > 0 is, again, deﬁned holding θ
constant.
There are two key mechanisms that yield the sign of (16): there is a
taxation externality associated with search and there is an “entitlement
eﬀect”. The taxation externality derives from the fact that, given that
some insurance is optimal (b>0), taxes are required to ﬁnance unem-
ployment expenditure. Individuals, however, do not take into account
that taxes can be lowered if search intensity (and hence employment) in-
creases. Therefore, ∂W/∂ss > 0. Moreover, the so called entitlement eﬀect
(c.f. Mortensen, 1977) will operate in this setting. Increasing the penalty
will be conducive to search among those who are sanctioned since individ-
uals will be eager to ﬁnd a new job in order to qualify for (to be entitled
to) UI beneﬁt receipt. As a corollary to proposition 1, the optimal policy
will involve an interior µ. In other words, the two tiered beneﬁt structure,
b>0, p>0,a n dµ ∈ (0,∞), dominates the uniform beneﬁt structure in
welfare terms.
Another interesting question is whether it will be optimal to have the
sanctioning rate depend on search intensity, given an optimal choice of b,
p,a n dµ. Since the inspection of search is the deﬁning characteristic of
the monitoring and sanctions system in this setting, we can equally well
phrase the question as: Given an optimal choice of a UI system with time
limits, is it optimal to introduce a system of monitoring and sanctions?
The following proposition gives the condition when the answer turns out
to be aﬃrmative
Proposition 2 Let ˆ ρ = {b,p,µ,σ =0 } denote the solution to the re-




λ +( 1− λ)(1 − p)






Proof. The proof proceeds as follows. Given that the two-tiered
beneﬁt structure is optimal, there are interior solutions to the ﬁrst-order
conditions (dW/db)=0 , (dW/dp)=0 ,a n d(dW/dµ)=0 . AU Is y s t e m
with monitoring and sanctions must be optimal if (dW/dσ) > 0 at the
point where σ =0and the remaining ﬁrst-order conditions hold. Some












where ∂W/∂se > 0 denotes the partial derivative of welfare with respect to
se holding θ constant, and ∂se/∂σ > 0 is also deﬁned holding θ constant.










λ +( 1− λ)(1 − p)







Equation (17) illustrates the basic trade-oﬀ in introducing a monitor-
ing and sanctions system. A monitoring and sanctions system restores
the search incentives among the eligible, ∂se/∂σ > 0. Again, this is a
good thing since there is a taxation externality which is not taken into ac-
count in the private determination of search. However, inspecting search
consumes real resources as indicated by the second term in (17). If this
cost is suﬃciently high, the monitoring and sanctions system will not be
introduced.7
Proposition 2 relates to the result in Boone and van Ours (2000). Their
key result is that a monitoring and sanction system will be more eﬃcient
in restoring search incentives than overall beneﬁt reductions. This result
is derived by means of numerical solutions to a model which is essentially
identical to the present one, but with c0 =0 . Proposition 2 shows that their
conclusion holds analytically. In addition it extends their result further:
given c0 =0 , a system with monitoring and sanctions will dominate the
two-tiered beneﬁt system analyzed by Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001).
By inspection of (16) and (17), the extent that search responds to
incentives is going to be crucial for the amount of beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation
and the argument for introducing monitoring and sanctions.
4 Numerical analysis
We have calibrated the model numerically so as to provide some informa-
tion on plausible numbers. The basic time unit is taken to be a quarter
7If introducing a sanction system involves a ﬁx e ds e t - u pc o s t( b e s i d e sC), then clearly
the set-up cost should not be too big either.
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η =0 .5.8 We ﬁx hours of work exogenously to h =0 .75 and use the





where κ<1. The marginal product of labor is normalized to unity and
we impose the Hosios (1990) eﬃciency condition β = η.
We calibrate the model for a uniform beneﬁts y s t e m( p =0 )w i t ha
replacement rate of b =0 .3. The parameters a and χ a r ec h o s e nw i t ha n
eye towards vacancy duration and search intensity. We set a =1 .7 and χ =
0.6. Remaining parameters (k,κ, and φ) are calibrated such that expected
unemployment duration is one quarter, the partial equilibrium elasticity
of the job hazard with respect to unemployment beneﬁts equals −0.5,a n d
the unemployment rate equals 6.5 percent. The calibrated values imply,
e.g., that the inﬂow into unemployment is 28 percent a year and that the
expected vacancy cost is almost a quarter of production. In the baseline
calibration, the expected vacancy duration is close to half a quarter and
search intensity equals s =0 .7. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values
in the baseline economy.
We also calibrate an alternative “less ﬂexible” economy which has an
identical unemployment rate but search is less responsive to incentives.9
We obtain this characterization by lowering the constant in the matching
function by 15 percent to a =1 .445 and compensating for this by a re-
duction in χ. A reduction in χ means that individuals place a lower value
on leisure. The consequences of this are twofold: ﬁrst, they are willing to
search harder; second, and crucially, search is less responsive to changes in
incentives. The value of χ implying an unemployment rate of 6.5 percent,
given the reduction in a,i sχ =0 .364165. The key outcomes in the base
runs are reported in detail in columns 1 and 4 in Table 2.
8Broersma and Van Ours (1999) give an overview of recent empirical studies of the
matching function. They ﬁnd that a value of η of 0.5 is a reasonable approximation.
9Let us be clear here: the key is that search intensity in the “less ﬂexible” economy
is less elastic than search in the baseline economy. We coin this economy “less ﬂexible”
for want of a better word.
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I n t e r e s tr a t e( =r a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e ) r =0
Job destruction rate φ =0 .069519
Leisure value κ =0 .239419, χ =0 .6
Matching function η =0 .5,a=1 .7
Wage negotiations β = η =0 .5
Production y =1
Vacancy costs k =1 .98335
4.1 Inﬁnite vs ﬁnite UI beneﬁtd u r a t i o n
We conduct the numerical analysis in steps. There are two natural focal
points in the model. The ﬁrst is the optimal uniform system (which has
inﬁnite UI duration: µ =0 ); the second is a system with optimal time
limits (ﬁnite UI duration: µ>0 but σ =0 ).
The last line of Table 2 presents welfare gains associated with partic-
ular policies. The welfare gain has the interpretation of a “consumption
tax” (in percent) that equalizes welfare across two policy regimes. To be
speciﬁc, let WR represent the welfare associated with the base run and
WA the welfare associated with an alternative policy. Our measure of the
welfare gain of policy A relative to policy R is given by the value of the
tax rate τ that solves WA [(1 − τ)m;·]=WR. With logarithmic utility
functions we have ∆W ≡ WA−WR = −ln(1−τ) ≈ τ. The welfare gains
are always reported relative to the base run. In order to compare, say, the
system with time limits with the optimal uniform system, one only has to
take the diﬀerence between the two entries for the welfare gain (∆W).
In columns 2 and 5 of Table 2, we report the results of determining the
optimal uniform replacement rate. The optimal replacement rate in the
baseline economy is around 36 percent. A higher replacement rate reduces
search incentives and incentives for wage restraint, so unemployment in-
creases. With the optimal uniform replacement rate, unemployment rises
to reach 8.1 percent. Individuals living in the baseline economy would
be willing to pay 0.33 percent of consumption to move from a replace-
ment rate of 30 percent to an optimal uniform one. The optimal uniform
replacement rate in the “less ﬂexible” economy is higher since the cost
of raising the replacement rate in terms of reducing search incentives is
lower. The replacement rate equals 44 percent in the less ﬂexible economy
16 IFAU — Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctionsTable 2: Numerical results without monitoring and sanctions
Baseline economy Less ﬂexible economy
Base run Optimal Optimal Base run Optimal Optimal
uniform time limit uniform time limit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b 0.300 0.363 0.553 0.300 0.441 0.557
p 0 0 0.410 0 0 0.305
µ —— 1.556 —— 1.199
σ —— 0 —— 0
se 0.700 0.607 0.556 0.839 0.734 0.715
ss — — 0.670 — — 0.774
θ 0.705 0.578 0.528 0.680 0.470 0.446
u (%) 6.50 8.13 8.19 6.50 8.73 8.75
ue (%) 6.50 8.13 2.84 6.50 8.73 3.36
us (%) — — 5.35 —— 5.39
w 0.913 0.909 0.908 0.903 0.987 0.896
t (%) 2.09 3.21 3.61 2.09 4.22 4.70
∆W (%) — 0.33 0.54 — 0.90 1.01
and unemployment increases to 8.7 percent. Individuals in the less ﬂexible
economy would be willing to pay 0.9 percent of consumption in order to
live in the optimal uniform system.10
The characteristics of the optimal system with time limits are given in
columns 3 and 6. In the baseline economy, beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation is sub-
stantial and the duration of UI beneﬁt receipt is fairly short — the value
of µ translates to an expected duration of around two months. The UI
replacement rate amounts to 55 percent of the wage; the penalty associ-
ated with the loss of entitlement is around 41 percent. The beneﬁts y s -
tem with limited duration is substantially more generous than the system
with inﬁnite duration; with ﬁnite duration, unemployment expenditure
per non-employed equals 40.5 percent. When search is less elastic, the UI
replacement rate is about the same (58 percent) as in our base case. How-
ever, the penalty associated with loosing entitlement is decidedly smaller
(31 percent), and the expected duration of UI receipt is longer (around
10Notice that one should not compare the values of the consumption taxes across the
two economies since the utility functions are diﬀerent.
IFAU — Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions 1711 weeks). The unemployment rate is only marginally higher than in the
uniform system.
Because the government has two additional instruments (µ and p)
besides b it is not surprising that the welfare gain in the exogenous time
limit case exceeds the welfare gain in the optimal uniform case in both
economies. The relative gain of introducing time limits is, however, smaller
in the less ﬂexible economy than in the baseline economy. Also note that
unemployment goes up by moving from the optimal uniform system to
exogenous time limits. In other words, unemployment is not a suﬃcient
statistic for welfare in this case.
4.2 Monitoring and sanctions
This section evaluates the case for monitoring and sanctions and calculates
the optimal monitoring and sanctions system. We also discuss the trade-oﬀ
between monitoring and sanctions and investigate whether the penalties
and sanctioning rates generated by the model are in broad conformity with
the data.
4.2.1 Are monitoring and sanctions optimal?
The argument in favor of monitoring and sanctions hinges crucially on the
costs of this system. Unfortunately, the cost associated with monitoring
and sanctions is something of a black box. Therefore, we give an upper
bound on the marginal cost below which monitoring and sanctions are an
ingredient of the optimal system. Since this upper bound turns out to be
very high, we go on to characterize the optimal UI system with monitoring
and sanctions.
Is it optimal to introduce monitoring and sanctions? In proposition 2
we stated the condition when the introduction of monitoring and sanctions
represents a welfare improvement. For the introduction of monitoring
and sanctions to be a welfare improvement relative to the case with time
limits, c0(0) has to be less than the gain as represented by greater search
incentives among UI recipients with monitoring. We have calculated the
cut-oﬀ value for our two economies. In our base case, this cut-oﬀ value
(ˆ c)e q u a l sˆ c =0 .076; in the alternative case, we have ˆ c =0 .047.B o t ho f
these numbers have to be considered extremely high. Since the marginal
product of labor and the labor force are normalized to unity, we can relate
these cut-oﬀ values to (private sector) GDP by dividing by the employment
18 IFAU — Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctionsrate (which is around 92 percent in the optimal system with time limits).
So, the calculated cut-oﬀ values suggest that as long as the marginal cost
is no greater than 4.7/0.92 = 5.1 (7.6/0.92 = 8.3)p e r c e n to fG D P ,i ti s
optimal to introduce monitoring and sanctions. Since these numbers are
very large, the introduction of monitoring and sanctions is most likely a
welfare improvement relative to the case with time limits.
What is the optimal design of a monitoring and sanctions system? This
clearly depends on the exact form of the cost function c(σ). Assume that
c(σ) takes the form of c(σ)=δσ. To estimate a reasonable value for δ,w e
used Swedish data on the relative number of employees at the Public Em-
ployment Service (PES), since PES oﬃcers are responsible for monitoring
j o bs e a r c hi nS w e d e n .W ea l s ou s e di n f o r m a t i o no nh o wo f t e ne a c hP E S
employee meets a particular unemployed, and the fraction of total time
that the PES oﬃcer spends in meetings with the unemployed. This calcu-
lation, which is presented in greater detail in Appendix B, suggests that
the marginal cost of monitoring is in the order of c(σ)=δσ =0 .00785.
Provided that σ ≥ 0.785 in Sweden, then δ =0 .01 is a conservative esti-
mate. We also conduct an alternative calculation where δ =0 .02.N o t e
that in both cases δ<ˆ c and hence monitoring and sanctions improve
welfare.
Table 3 presents some numbers that correspond to the optimal systems
in each economy for the two values of δ. The optimal system involves σ =1
given our assumption σ ∈ [0,1]. This particular result should be taken
with a due grain of salt given the uncertainty about the costs of monitoring
and the properties of the inspection technology. It is nevertheless inter-
esting to note that a system with monitoring and sanctions are associated
with non-trivial welfare gains relative to the alternatives characterized in
Table 2. The relative gain of designing an optimal system with monitoring
and sanction is roughly similar in the two economies. Also note that the
optimal replacement rate in UI is higher when we introduce monitoring
and sanctions. Both economies experience a slight fall in unemployment
as compared to Table 2, a result driven by a substantial increase in search
eﬀort among the unemployed (particularly those eligible for UI who now
face additional incentives to search). Finally, note that the fraction of
unemployed with a sanction is considerably lower in Table 3 than in the
columns with exogenous time limits in Table 2. Less people need to be
penalized in a monitoring system in order to get similar welfare and search
incentive eﬀects.
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Baseline economy Less ﬂexible economy
δ =0 .01 δ =0 .02 δ =0 .01 δ =0 .02
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b 0.626 0.617 0.619 0.610
p 0.564 0.584 0.511 0.570
µ 1.207 1.039 1.017 0.757
σ 11 11
se 0.755 0.746 0.856 0.848
ss 0.737 0.753 0.842 0.863
θ 0.407 0.408 0.371 0.373
u (%) 7.87 7.88 8.47 8.48
ue (%) 5.75 5.96 7.07 7.37
us (%) 2.12 1.92 1.40 1.11
w 0.906 0.906 0.894 0.894
t (%) 4.60 4.66 5.33 5.35
∆W (%) 1.15 1.08 1.45 1.38
Table 3 indicates that the trade-oﬀ between monitoring and sanctions
depends on the costs of monitoring: the higher the cost, the lower the mon-
itoring rate and the higher the penalty. We have examined this trade-oﬀ in
greater detail. In particular we have calculated optimal combinations of µ
and p for diﬀerent values of δ,w h e r eδ is varied from zero to (implausibly)
l a r g en u m b e r s .W es e tσ =1and allow b to adjust optimally. In order to
approach the Beckerian corner solution (µ → 0, p → 1), monitoring costs
need to be extremely high. For example, if δ =0 .14 the optimal system
in the baseline economy features p =0 .929 and µ =0 .234. Risk aversion
in combination with a random monitoring technology implies that it is
generally not optimal to impose the maximal sanction.
4.2.2 A brief look at the data
Having calculated the optimal systems with monitoring and sanctions it
is tempting to relate the predictions of the model to the data. Some of
the parameters of the monitoring and sanctions system are of course unob-
servable. However, there are observations on the UI replacement rates, the
penalties for violating search requirements, and the associated sanctioning
20 IFAU — Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctionsrates. Presumably, there is a lot of noise in the data pertaining to sanction
rates. Nevertheless, there is great variation in these data as is clear from
Grubb (2001). It seems that the US and Switzerland are the extreme cases
in terms of having systems with a large number of sanctions. In the US
in the late 1990s, around 10 percent of beneﬁciaries were sanctioned each
quarter for behavior during the beneﬁt period. In addition, some 25 per-
cent of the (stock of) eligible unemployed were “sanctioned” because they
exhausted their beneﬁts.11 Based on these data, the quarterly sanction
rate in the US would be in the order of 35 percent. With the exception
of Switzerland, sanctions during the beneﬁt period are substantially less
common in the European countries; in fact, the sanction rates are typically
lower than one percent per quarter. See Grubb (2001) for further details.
The number of sanctions seems to be inversely related to the severeness
of the penalty. In the US, the normal sanction for a job search infringement
is a loss of beneﬁts for one week.12 In Sweden, on the other hand, the
penalty until recently was the loss of beneﬁts for twelve weeks.13
What does the model have to say about the number of sanctions?
Figure 1 addresses this question by plotting the sanctioning rates against
σ and assuming δ =0 .01. In addition to the baseline and the less ﬂexible
economy, we also consider an economy with low turnover.14 Sanctioning
rates decline in σ for two reasons: ﬁrstly, for given se,ar i s ei nσ reduces
π(se);and, secondly, a rise in σ raises se.
When σ =1 , as is optimal given our assumptions, the quarterly sanc-
tion rates hover between 10 and 30 percent depending on the exact as-
sumptions; see Table 4. The number of sanctions in the baseline economy
best conform to sanctioning data for the US. To get at the numbers for
the typical European country, it appears that one would have to apply a
11This estimate is a crude average for the period 1995-2000. The number of exhaus-
tions per quarter amounted to some 600 000 individuals, the number of unemployed to
6.5 millions, and the fraction eligible for UI to 35 percent. Source: US Department of
Labor (labor force statistics and UI program statistics).
12Notice, though, that there is a rather harsh ”penalty” associated with the expiration
of UI beneﬁts in the US. In 1991, beneﬁts were reduced by more than 60 percent when
beneﬁts expired and the individual was forced to claim welfare beneﬁts instead; see
Wang and Williamson (1996).
13The Swedish system has recently been changed in the direction of smaller penalties.
14The “low turnover” economy has a lower job destruction rate φ (around 22 percent
p e ry e a r )a n dh i g h e rv a l u ef o ra in the matching function to keep unemployment at the
baseline value of 6.5 percent.














Precision of inspection technology
Figure 1: Quarterly sanction rates, δ =0 .01
Table 4: Quarterly sanction rates according to the model
Baseline economy Less ﬂexible economy Low turnover economy
δ =0 .01 0.296 0.146 0.242
δ =0 .02 0.264 0.115 0.221
22 IFAU — Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctionscombination of less elastic search, lower turnover, and higher monitoring
costs.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the design of optimal unemployment in-
surance in a search equilibrium framework where search eﬀort among the
unemployed is not perfectly observable. We have examined to what extent
the optimal policy should involve monitoring of search eﬀort and beneﬁt
sanctions if observed search is found insuﬃcient. The results suggest that
the introduction of a system with monitoring and sanctions represents a
welfare improvement for reasonable values of the monitoring costs. Those
costs would have to be implausibly high — higher than ﬁve percent of GDP
— for this conclusion not to hold.
The policy prescription following from our analysis is thus diﬀerent
from Becker’s (1968) well known result, where the penalty should be max-
imal and the probability of getting caught should be close to zero. There
are two key assumptions delivering our results. First, individuals are risk
averse and, second, monitoring is imperfect. With imperfect monitoring
some individuals will be sanctioned even though they search to rule and
giving them the maximal penalty is not optimal with risk aversion.
While we are reasonably comfortable in saying that monitoring and
sanctions represent a welfare improvement, it is much more diﬃcult to give
clear advice on the characteristics of such a system. The reason for this
conclusion is that the exact formulation of the monitoring and sanctions
system depends on the cost of running such a system. Unfortunately, the
cost of running the system is something of a black box.
An issue that we have not addressed is the possibility that formal
search requirements may induce individuals to use formal rather than in-
formal search methods and therefore bring little increase in total search
intensity. Nevertheless, it is likely that general search requirements — such
as the number of job applications ﬁled during a week — should minimize
the risk of substitution between search channels. Presumably, substitution
is going to be more severe in systems where search requirements are linked
to formal channels such as referrals by the public employment service. On
this account, therefore, search requirements speciﬁed in terms of indepen-
dent job search, as used in the US, the Netherlands and Switzerland, seem
to be preferable.
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This appendix addresses the “structural” interpretation of our sanctioning
probability: π(se)=1− σse. Suppose, realistically, that beneﬁta d m i n i s -
trators observe search with error: se
o = se+ε,ε ∈ [εL,ε U].S i n c ese ∈ [0,1]
then so should se
o. This in turn implies restrictions on εL,ε U.I fse
o ∈ [0,1],
it must be true that εL = −se and εU =1− se.
Let us introduce a parameter that indexes the extent of observation
error. In particular let ε ∈ [−(1 − ˜ σ)se,(1 − ˜ σ)(1 − se)]. If ˜ σ =1 ,t h e r e
is no observation error. If ˜ σ =0 , observed search belongs to the entire
admissible range. Suppose also that ε is uniform. Then ˜ σ =0is a com-
pletely random inspection technology. We think of ˜ σ as a parameter that
the central government can invest resources in improving.
An individual is sanctioned whenever se
o ≤ R,w h e r eR ∈ [0,1] denotes
the search requirement. The probability of being sanctioned given that












Since εU − εL =1− ˜ σ and εL = −(1 − ˜ σ)se,w eg e t
π =
R
1 − ˜ σ
−
˜ σ
1 − ˜ σ
se
Now we want to impose some restrictions on the parameters of the
inspections technology (R, ˜ σ) to make sure that π ∈ [0,1] for all se ∈ [0,1].
We impose the following conditions
1. If se =0then π =1 .
2. If se =1then π ∈ [0,1].
The ﬁrst condition gives R =1− ˜ σ.G i v e n R =1− ˜ σ, the second
condition yields ˜ σ ∈ [0,0.5]. The conditions we impose on the parameters
thus imply that an individual who searches full time is sanctioned with
positive probability, i.e., there is a probability of making Type II errors
for all values of se.
In sum, the above assumptions lead to the following formulation for π
π =1−
˜ σ
1 − ˜ σ
se, ˜ σ ∈ [0,0.5]
24 IFAU — Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctionsor alternatively, deﬁning σ =˜ σ/(1 − ˜ σ)
π =1− σse,σ∈ [0,1]
w h i c hi sw h a tw eh a v ei nt h em a i nt e x t .
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itoring
To obtain a reasonable value for the cost of monitoring an additional
individual (c(σ)) we performed the following calculation. We relied on
data from Sweden, where PES administrators are responsible for monitor-
ing whether unemployed individuals have searched to rule or not. Three
sources of information were used: (i) the relative number of employees at
the PES; (ii) the fraction of time that a PES oﬃcer meets with the un-
employed; and (iii) the number of contacts between the PES oﬃcer and
a particular unemployed individual. Information pertaining to items (ii)
and (iii) is taken from Lundin (2000).
In the main text the total cost of the monitoring and sanctions system
was speciﬁed as: C = c(σ)µuew. To get an approximate value for C we
start be calculating the wage bill paid to individuals involved in monitor-
ing. Since the labor force and the marginal product of labor are normalized
to unity, the wage bill is measured relative to these items. The PES service
employs approximately 10,000 individuals in Sweden, which translates to
around 0.25 percent of the labor force. On average PES oﬃcers spend 30
percent of their time in meetings with the unemployed. Assuming that the
unemployed are monitored each time they meet with a PES oﬃcer we have
C =0 .0025×0.3w =0 .00075w.T h u sw eh a v eC = c(σ)µuew =0 .00075w.
Turning to the left-hand side of this equation, we set the number of un-
employed individuals eligible for UI to 5 percent. With this assumption,
we only need an estimate of µ to get an estimate of c(σ).T h e i n f o r m a -
tion used to estimate µ is derived from a question put to PES oﬃcers
regarding the number of meetings with individuals searching for a job.
When asked about their contact frequency, 35 percent of PES oﬃcers an-
swered “at most once a month”; 34 percent answered “at most once every
other month”; and 31 percent answered “at most once every quarter”.
Thus on average a PES oﬃcer has (1 × 0.35 + 0.5 × 0.34 + 0.31/3) × 3=
1.91 meetings with a particular unemployed per quarter. Hence we have
c(σ)=0 .00075/(µue)=0 .00075/(1.91 × 0.05) ≈ 0.00785.T h e r e i s s t i l l
one unknown in this equation, however; the estimated value of c(σ) per-
tains to a given value of σ. Assuming that c(σ)=δσ,w eh a v eδ =0 .01
for σ =0 .785 and δ =0 .02 for σ =0 .785/2.
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